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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The history of the international bond markets is one of constant innovation 
and adaptation. One of the more-significant recent examples of this is the 
development of an international Islamic “bond” market and the position of 
sovereign borrowers at the forefront of that development of this market. 
A. Islamic Bonds 
Strictly speaking, Islamic bonds do not exist. The key aspects of Islamic 
doctrine that define what is and is not permissible in the finance field help 
explain why. Most people are familiar with the Islamic prohibition on the 
charging of interest (or riba). This prohibition is one of four major prohibitions 
that define the structuring of the Islamic equivalent of conventional bonds 
(referred to as sukuk), the others being a prohibition on uncertainty (gharar), a 
prohibition on gambling and speculation (maisir), and a prohibition on the use 
of or dealing in certain banned commodities (such as alcohol or pork). In 
contrast, Islamic doctrine encourages investors to share in the risks as well as in 
the rewards associated with particular investment activities. In conventional 
terms, equity-type investment is good (shares can go up as well as down) 
whereas debt investment (guaranteed return subject to credit risk, which 
Islamic doctrine does not regard as a real risk) is bad. Conventional bonds, of 
course, are the latter. 
B. A Brief History of International Sukuk 
In December 2001, Kumpulan Guthrie Berhad, a Malaysian company, 
completed the first international sukuk issue. This was a U.S.–dollar-
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denominated sukuk, targeted at investors in Asia and the Middle East. In July 
2002, the Federation of Malaysia completed the second such issue. This was a 
U.S.–dollar-denominated sukuk sold internationally, including in the United 
States. This was also the first sukuk issue rated by international credit-rating 
agencies. 
Since these first two transactions, the international sukuk market has grown 
significantly and has involved issuers located in Asia, the Middle East, and 
elsewhere. Although the market is dominated by borrowers in Malaysia and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council region (comprising Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), international sukuk have also 
been issued by borrowers located in Germany, Pakistan, Indonesia, and the 
United States. 
C. The Importance of Sovereign Borrowers 
In many cases, one of the early issuers of international sukuk in a particular 
country or territory has been a sovereign or quasi-sovereign borrower. Apart 
from the Malaysian sovereign sukuk, this has been true of Bahrain, Qatar, 
Pakistan, Indonesia, Ras Al Khaimah (one of the Emirates making up the 
United Arab Emirates), Germany (where the issuer was the State of Saxony-
Anhalt), and Saudi Arabia (where the issuer was the Islamic Development 
Bank, a supranational located in the city of Jeddah). 
A key driver of the sovereign involvement in many cases was the desire to 
establish a benchmark and to encourage the development of a sukuk market in 
the relevant country. Although less significant in countries where Islamic 
principles are already a part of national law, a secondary factor behind 
sovereign involvement was the need to facilitate the development of a legal 
framework that would support sukuk issuance. Indeed, the U.K. government, 
which has been considering a sukuk issue since mid-2007, has confirmed that 
these reasons are key factors in its desire to access the sukuk market. 
II 
KEY DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVEREIGN SUKUK ISSUES 
The innovation and adaptation that first enabled the issuance of Islamic 
“bonds” and thereafter improved the structures initially used are particularly 
notable in a number of specific sukuk issues. The Malaysian issue used 
structuring that enabled an Islamic security to substantially replicate a 
conventional debt security. Three other Islamic issues of note are the Bahrain 
sukuk, the fourth sovereign sukuk (and fifth international sukuk), which 
significantly refined the structure of international sukuk issues; the Pakistan 
sukuk, which was one of the last international sukuk to use a true-sale structure; 
and the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk, which was the first sovereign sukuk to be 
issued under a sukuk-issuance program. 
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A.  The Malaysian Sukuk 
In the Malaysian sukuk, the Federal Lands Commissioner of Malaysia (a 
statutory entity set up to hold government land) sold beneficial title to certain 
parcels of land to a newly formed Malaysian special-purpose company owned 
by the government. The special-purpose company (the issuer) funded the 
purchase price by issuing trust certificates (or sukuk) to international investors. 
The Federal Lands Commissioner continued to hold the registered, legal title to 
the land, but as bare trustee for the benefit of the issuer. This avoided the need 
to register title and also avoided stamp and transfer duties. 
Having issued the sukuk, the issuer and the government then entered into a 
master ijara (or lease) contract (governed by Malaysian law) under which the 
parties agreed to enter into successive semiannual leases of the land up to the 
maturity date of the sukuk. Under each lease, the rent was set by reference to 
the then-current, six-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)1 and was 
paid by the government (as lessee) to the issuer (as lessor) at the end of the 
relevant lease period. The government also entered into a unilateral purchase 
undertaking, in which it undertook in favor of the issuer to repurchase the land 
for the same price at which it was sold at the maturity date of the sukuk. 
The conditions of the sukuk in turn provided that the holders were entitled 
to receive periodic distributions on their sukuk in amounts and on dates 
matching the rental payments due under the lease agreements.2 In addition, the 
conditions of the sukuk provided that, at its maturity, the holders were entitled 
to be repaid the amount invested by them. Essentially, therefore, the issuer 
simply passed through to the holders of the sukuk on each periodic distribution 
date the payments received by it from the government under the lease and, on 
the maturity date, the payment received by it from the government under the 
purchase undertaking. The conditions further provided that recourse against 
the issuer be limited to the amounts actually received by the issuer from the 
government, thereby making it clear that the credit risk the investors were 
assuming was that of the government. The issuer was thus established in a 
manner designed to make bankruptcy as remote as possible. 
Unlike conventional debt securities, which record a debt owed by the issuer 
to the investor, sukuk are trust certificates that record a trust declared by the 
issuer over certain assets. Thus, sukuk are not debt instruments at all; instead, 
they are designed to convey an ownership interest in one or more tangible 
underlying assets. This is an important feature, for it is the ownership interest 
conveyed by a sukuk that makes it a tradable instrument for Sharia purposes.3 
 
 1. Islamic scholars generally accept the use of interest-based reference rates on international 
sukuk transactions. 
 2. Malaysia Global Sukuk, Inc. 22 (July 3, 2002) (prospectus, on file with Law & Contemporary 
Problems). 
 3. Changing Sharia interpretations and the global financial crisis have affected the sukuk market 
and sovereign issuance in particular. See infra Part III. 
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As with a conventional debt security issued by Malaysia, a number of risks 
inherent in the Malaysian sukuk required investor protection. A conventional, 
unsecured sovereign debt security includes events of default in the conditions 
(which provide the investors with an acceleration right in the event of 
nonpayment or of certain other events) and may also include a negative pledge. 
The Malaysian sukuk included similar provisions, although many of these 
provisions could be found in the lease agreement rather than in the conditions 
of the sukuk (reflecting that the sukuk were issued by a special-purpose 
vehicle). To ensure that the issuer would have recourse to funds if an event of 
default occurred, the purchase undertaking by the government included a 
promise to buy the land back following an event of default at the original sale 
price. 
Other risk concerns that were identified as being specific to the Malaysian 
sukuk (as opposed to a conventional debt security issued by Malaysia) included 
the following: 
1. Who bears the maintenance costs for the land (in particular any 
buildings or equipment on the land)? Under Sharia principles, the 
lessee is responsible for the day-to-day (or ordinary) maintenance of 
the assets being leased while the lessor is responsible for all other 
maintenance and repair (major maintenance). Reflecting that the 
lessor was a special-purpose company and therefore not in a position 
to undertake major maintenance, the issuer and the government 
entered into a service-agency agreement under which the government, 
acting as the issuer’s agent, agreed to perform any major maintenance 
necessary against reimbursement by the issuer at maturity. 
Recognizing that this could involve the issuer’s expending funds which 
it would not have, the purchase price of the land at maturity was 
amended to comprise the original price paid plus any amount owed by 
the issuer for major maintenance, with the two maintenance amounts 
being set off against each other. 
2. What happens if the property is destroyed? Under Sharia principles, 
a lessee cannot be required to pay rental for a property that has been 
destroyed because that would place an important incidence of 
ownership on the lessee (rather than on the owner). Thus the leases in 
the Malaysian sukuk provided that they would terminate on a total-
loss event occurring in relation to the land. Total-loss events include 
expropriation or destruction beyond economic repair of the land. This 
would mean, however, that if a total-loss event occurred, investors 
would suffer not only the loss of the periodic distribution amounts due 
after the date of the loss but would also not receive the return of their 
principal, for there would be no asset to sell at maturity. This is a risk 
they were not prepared to take, so the service-agency agreement 
imposed an obligation on the government (as agent of the issuer) to 
insure against a total loss, with the costs of that insurance to be 
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reimbursed by the issuer (in the same manner that the costs of major 
maintenance are reimbursed). Accordingly, in the event that a total-
loss event occurred, investors would have rights to the insurance 
monies payable for that loss. 
3. What happens to the land on a default? Under the Malaysian sukuk 
structure, the issuer is the beneficial owner of the land. The trust 
certificates issued by the issuer represent an undivided beneficial 
ownership interest in the trust assets (being the issuer’s rights to the 
land as well as its rights respecting the underlying contractual 
documentation such as the leases and the purchase undertaking). 
Given this ownership structure, an investor might reasonably conclude 
that on a default by the government, he would have recourse to the 
land and could sell it to fund repayment of his sukuk. The conditions 
of the sukuk, however, specifically provide that under no 
circumstances shall the issuer or any investor have the right to sell the 
land other than to the government in accordance with the purchase 
undertaking. This limited-recourse provision reflects the commercial 
intention (seeking to replicate in a Sharia-compliant manner, and as 
far as possible, an unsecured conventional debt security). As a result 
of this provision, should the government default, the only rights the 
investors would have respecting that default would be to sue the 
government for failure to perform its obligation under the purchase 
undertaking to buy the land back on an event of default occurring. 
This right is the equivalent of the right of an investor in a conventional 
debt instrument to sue for unpaid principal. 
B.  The Bahrain Sukuk 
In the Bahrain sukuk, the original intention was to have a similar sale and 
leaseback structure as Malaysia did. For various Bahrain-specific reasons, 
though, it was not possible for the government to sell the land, so a head-lease–
sublease structure was devised. The head-lease–sublease allowed the Bahraini 
government to lease certain vacant land located at Bahrain’s airport to the 
issuer, a special-purpose Bahraini company established by the central bank for 
the purposes of the transaction, for a term of 100 years.4 A single, advance 
rental payment was made by the issuer for this lease and funded by the issuer 
issuing the sukuk. The issuer then sublet the land back to the Bahraini 
Government for the term of the sukuk. At maturity, a termination payment was 
made by the Bahraini Government to the issuer for the head lease, and this 
payment funded the redemption of the sukuk by the issuer. 
One other area in which the Bahrain sukuk was innovative involved the 
position on enforcement. In a conventional debt security for which a trustee is 
 
 4. BMA International Sukuk Company 20 (June 30, 2004) (prospectus, on file with Law & 
Contemporary Problems). 
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appointed, the duties of the trustee are minimal, so long as the issuer is 
performing its obligations. However, should the issuer default, the trustee 
assumes significant responsibilities in terms of enforcement against the issuer. 
One issue that concerned the managers and investors in the Bahrain sukuk was 
that, as a government-owned company, the issuer would be susceptible to 
direction by the government and might not therefore take the necessary action 
to enforce against the government in the event of a default. In addition, as a 
special-purpose company, the issuer (even if it wanted to) might not have the 
ability to take enforcement action either through lack of funds or through lack 
of personnel. 
This issue had also been considered on the Malaysia sukuk; the solution 
there was for the issuer to appoint an independent third party to act as a 
cotrustee with the same rights and obligations as the issuer in its capacity as 
trustee. In the event of any disagreement or conflict between the two trustees, 
the views of the cotrustee would prevail. 
In the Bahrain sukuk, a slightly different solution was adopted: the issuer (in 
its capacity as trustee) at the outset of the transaction delegated its rights and 
obligations as trustee to an independent trust company contingent on a default 
occurring. The effect of the provision was that if a default did occur, the issuer 
would cease to have any duties as trustee, and these duties would pass to the 
independent trust company, putting the sukuk holders in much the same 
position as holders of conventional debt securities for which a trustee is 
appointed. This delegation feature is now standard on almost all international 
sukuk. 
C.  The Pakistan Sukuk 
Like the Malaysia sukuk, the Pakistan sukuk involved a sale and leaseback 
structure. An interesting feature of the Pakistan sukuk (and of the Bahrain 
sukuk before it) was that the sukuk assets were sold in a true sale (where legal 
title to the assets concerned passed to the issuer) as opposed to the kind of 
beneficial ownership distinguishing the Malaysian sukuk. The asset was a part 
of a motorway. Because the sections of the motorway being sold ran through a 
large number of different administrative districts, the transaction involved the 
registration of the sale of approximately 125 separate land parcels in nine 
separate administrative districts. All parcels were required to be registered at 
closing, involving a significant administrative burden. This appears to have been 
one of the last of the true-sale, unsecured sukuk transactions, with subsequent 
issues reverting to the Malaysian formula and typically conveying only a 
beneficial, unregistered ownership interest in the underlying assets. 
D.  The Ras Al Khaimah Sukuk 
Like Pakistan’s, the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk involved the sale and leaseback 
of a road owned by the government. Unlike the previous sovereign sukuk 
transactions, though, the issuer in the Ras Al Khaimah sukuk was a Cayman 
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Islands–incorporated, orphan special-purpose company rather than a locally 
incorporated, government-controlled company.5 This reflected the position 
adopted by a number of influential Islamic scholars that there should be no 
ownership relationship between the issuer and the underlying obligor absent a 
good reason an independent entity could not be established. 
As there was no such good reason regarding the Ras Al Khaimah 
transaction, the parties agreed that a Cayman Islands orphan company would 
be used. But during the process of the transaction, the Ras Al Khaimah 
government became concerned that it might lose control over its assets, given 
its lack of control over the issuer. The parties debated a number of possible 
solutions, including, among others, amending the articles of association of the 
issuer, giving additional contractual comfort to the government, and relying on 
the reputation and good faith of the issuer–administrator and its directors. 
Ultimately, specific additional contractual provisions were included, which gave 
sufficient comfort to the government to enable it to proceed with the 
transaction. 
The Ras Al Khaimah sukuk was issued under a sukuk program, the first 
such program to be established by a sovereign. Subsequently, the government 
of Dubai has also established a sukuk program. 
III 
THE IMPACT OF THE 2008 GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON SOVEREIGN SUKUK 
ISSUANCE 
Since late 2007, the sukuk market has been adversely affected by two 
separate factors—a change in the position of most major Islamic scholars on the 
acceptable types of structure6 and the impact of the global financial crisis that 
started towards the end of 2007. An International Monetary Fund paper 
published in July 2008 showed total sukuk issuance in the years 2004 to 2007 
growing from approximately $7.2 billion7 in 2004 to $12.0 billion in 2005, $27.4 
billion in 2006, and $38.6 billion in 2007.8 At the end of 2007, outstanding sukuk 
globally exceeded $90 billion. The paper suggested that, based on current 
trends, the total amount of issued sukuk was likely to exceed $200 billion by the 
end of 2010.9 
In September 2009, Standard and Poor’s published a report showing that 
sukuk issuance in 2008 was approximately only $15 billion, reflecting both the 
 
 5. RAK Capital 51–52 (May 2, 2008) (prospectus, on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 6. In March 2008, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) published new guidance on the permitted structures for sukuk, which significantly restricted 
the future use of previously available structures. ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR 
ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SHARI’AH BOARD RESOLUTIONS ON SUKUK 2–3 (2008). 
 7. All references to currency are in U.S. dollars. 
 8. Andreas Jobst et al., Islamic Bond Issuance—What Sovereign Debt Managers Need to Know, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (July 2008), http://www.imf.org/external/pubind.htm. 
 9. Id. 
WEDDERBURN-DAY 1/16/2011 
332 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:325 
adverse effects of the scholars’ acceptance of the sukuk and the 2008 financial 
crisis.10 The same report noted that issuance in the first seven months of 2009 
was approximately $9.3 billion compared to $11.1 billion in the same period of 
2008, suggesting a continued slowdown in 2009. But in November 2009, 
Moody’s issued a report noting that global sukuk issuance had surged by forty 
percent in the first ten months of 2009 compared with the corresponding period 
of 2008,11 reflecting both continued recovery in the later part of 2009 and the 
significant slowdown experienced at the end of 2008. The Moody’s report noted 
that “sovereigns and government-related issuers (GRIs) have now become the 
most common sukuk issuers as they face a need to launch a variety of funding 
programmes amid declining economic activity, fiscal deficits and lower 
commodity prices.”12 
Although the changing views of Islamic scholars, formalized and published 
in March 2008,13 significantly reduced the number of structures acceptable for 
use in sukuk and therefore contributed to the fall in sukuk issuance in 2008, this 
guidance did not significantly adversely affect sovereign issuance. The reason 
was that the guidance did not affect the use of the ijara (sale and leaseback) 
structure, and it is this structure that has been most used by sovereign issuers of 
sukuk. 
One notable significant effect of the global financial crisis on sovereign 
sukuk issuance was the delay in issuance by the U.K. government of its debut 
sukuk. The U.K. government conducted public consultations in May and 
November 2007 on its plans to issue a sukuk. A number of responses were 
received to both consultations and, in June 2008, the government published its 
response.14 In the response, the then-Economic Secretary to the Treasury 
confirmed that the government was committed to continuing support of the 
long-term development of Islamic finance in the United Kingdom. The 
response stated that the government favored establishing a program for the 
issuance of short-term sukuk instruments using an ijara-based structure. But the 
government recognized that a number of issues relating to the structuring, 
regulation, and taxation of sukuk remained, which it intended to continue to 
address. 
In the autumn of 2008 and reflecting the effects of the global financial crisis, 
the U.K. government announced that its plans to issue sukuk had been placed 
on hold. But the government has continued to work on resolving the obstacles 
 
 10. Press Release, Standard & Poor’s, Sukuk Market Has Continued to Progress in 2009, Despite 
Some Roadblocks (Sept. 2, 2009) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 11. Press Release, Moody’s Investors Service, Sukuk Issuance Surges, Dominated by Government-
Related Issuers (Nov. 10, 2009) (on file with Law & Contemporary Problems). 
 12. Id. 
 13. See ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING ORGANIZATION FOR ISLAMIC FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, 
supra note 6. 
 14. DEBT MANAGEMENT OFFICE OF HER MAJESTY’S TREASURY, GOVERNMENT STERLING 
SUKUK ISSUANCE: A RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION X (June 2008). 
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identified in the response and most recently has enacted legislation15 designed to 
address the unequal regulatory treatment in the United Kingdom of sukuk and 
conventional bonds. 
It is likely that, as markets around the world emerge from the global 
economic downturn experienced since late 2007, activity in the sukuk market 
will increase and adaptation and innovation in the market will continue. One 
anticipated trend in particular is the use of the market by non-Islamic 
borrowers based in non-Islamic countries. The governments of a number of 
European and Asian non-Muslim countries have expressed interest in the 
possibility of sukuk issuance and a recent high profile example of a sukuk from 
a non-Muslim international borrower was the issue by GE Capital Sukuk Ltd. 
in November 2009 of a $500 million sukuk. 
 
 
 15. The Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (Eng.), amended by (Regulated Activities) 
(Amendment) Order 2010 No. 905. 
